Taylor Swift’s Legal Team Filed to Dismiss the Showgirl Trademark Lawsuit. They Called the Case “Absurd.”
Two months after Las Vegas performer Maren Flagg filed a trademark infringement lawsuit over Taylor Swift’s album title The Life of a Showgirl, Swift’s legal team came out swinging. On Tuesday (May 26), attorneys at Venable LLP filed a motion to dismiss the complaint in the US District Court for the Central District of California on behalf of all four defendants: Swift, her rights management company TAS Rights Management, UMG Recordings, and UMG’s merchandise arm Bravado International Group Merchandising Services. The motion describes the lawsuit as “merely Plaintiff’s latest attempt to generate publicity by associating herself with Ms. Swift” and asks the court to throw it out entirely. A hearing on the motion is scheduled for August 5.
The lawsuit was originally filed on March 30 by Flagg, who performs under the stage name Maren Wade. Flagg registered the trademark “Confessions of a Showgirl” in 2015 in connection with a cabaret show, a newspaper column for Las Vegas Weekly, a book, and a podcast. Her complaint alleged that Swift’s album title “shares the same structure, the same dominant phrase, and the same overall commercial impression” as her trademark, and that both operate in overlapping entertainment markets directed at the same consumers. Flagg escalated the case in April by filing for a preliminary injunction, seeking an order that would block Swift from continuing to sell merchandise bearing The Life of a Showgirlbranding while the lawsuit proceeds. Swift’s team filed its opposition to that injunction request simultaneously with the motion to dismiss on May 26, and a hearing took place on May 27. Judge Serena R. Murillo did not rule from the bench and indicated a written decision would follow.
The motion to dismiss attacks Flagg’s complaint on multiple fronts. On the substance of the trademark claims, Swift’s attorneys were pointed: “The premise of Plaintiff’s reverse confusion claims, that consumers will believe Plaintiff’s cabaret-style goods and services are affiliated with or sponsored by Ms. Swift, is absurd. Plaintiff utterly fails to plausibly allege likelihood of confusion.” The filing argues the goods and services at issue are fundamentally different: The Life of a Showgirl debuted with a record-breaking 4.002 million equivalent album units in its first week, spent 12 nonconsecutive weeks at No. 1 on the Billboard 200, and became Luminate’s top album of 2025, versus a niche cabaret show with no currently scheduled performances, a book that is currently unavailable, and a podcast with no published episodes. In a particularly pointed footnote, Swift’s lawyers noted that the only digital content Flagg has posted since September 2025 consists of social media posts repeatedly attempting to associate herself with Swift through “unauthorized use of Ms. Swift’s intellectual property.” Ticketmaster
The motion also targets the procedural quality of the complaint itself. Swift’s lawyers argued the filing constitutes “impermissible shotgun pleading,” noting that Flagg “repeatedly refers to the Defendants collectively in her allegations without specifying which Defendant(s) are responsible for any particular act, despite their highly distinct roles in the music industry.” According to the filing, Flagg lumps all four defendants together more than 90 times without differentiation, a pleading deficiency that Swift’s attorneys argue independently warrants dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Swift’s legal team noted that UMG Recordings and Bravado have “highly distinct roles” from Swift herself in the creation and distribution of her art, and that collapsing all four into a single set of allegations fails the basic pleading standard required to survive a motion to dismiss.
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On the USPTO angle, Flagg had pointed to the Patent and Trademark Office’s initial refusal of TASRM’s application to register The Life of a Showgirl as a trademark as evidence supporting her likelihood-of-confusion argument. Swift’s motion rejects that framing directly, calling it an attempt to “dress up a non-final Office Action into dispositive proof of a likelihood of confusion.” The motion notes the USPTO’s action “explicitly did not find a likelihood of confusion between Plaintiff’s Mark and the majority of the goods/services covered in the Application,” and that the intent-to-use application had no specimens of use submitted at the time of the refusal, which significantly limits its evidentiary weight. As intellectual property attorneys have noted in the context of Swift’s own recent trademark filings for her voice and likeness, a non-final Office Action in an intent-to-use application is a procedural step, not a judicial determination of infringement.
Two additional grounds for dismissal round out the motion. On California unfair competition claims, Swift’s lawyers argued that Flagg, a Nevada resident, has not established that any relevant conduct emanated from California or caused injury there. On personal jurisdiction, the motion notes that Swift “is domiciled, with her permanent home, in Tennessee,” directly contradicting Flagg’s complaint, which alleged Swift was a California resident. Both grounds, if accepted, would require portions of the case to be dismissed regardless of the underlying trademark merits. The jurisdiction argument mirrors the approach Swift’s team used successfully in prior litigation to narrow the venues in which claims against her can proceed.
There is a procedural wrinkle worth noting. Flagg’s attorney Jaymie Parkkinen filed a same-day notice objecting to the timing of the dismissal motion, pointing out that Swift’s legal team had not complied with Local Rule 7-3, which requires parties to meet and confer at least seven days before filing. Swift’s counsel acknowledged the non-compliance but argued the early filing was necessary so the court would have the motion available before the May 27 preliminary injunction hearing. Flagg expressly reserved all rights to oppose the motion and to amend her complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. Judge Murillo separately granted an application from the defendants to file certain declarations under seal, covering non-public financial and strategic business information submitted in opposition to the preliminary injunction, with redacted versions remaining publicly available.
The Showgirl case is one of several active legal disputes that illustrate how aggressively the music industry’s biggest stakeholders are protecting commercial identity. Taylor Swift’s trademark filings for her voice and likeness represent the most proactive example. The Dua Lipa Samsung lawsuit involves unauthorized commercial use of an artist’s image. UMG’s AI cease-and-desist patent points to automated enforcement infrastructure being built at the label level. The Salt-N-Pepa termination rights appeal and the George Clinton royalties lawsuit both reflect long-running disputes over how artist contracts are enforced decades after signing. What makes the Showgirl case distinct is the direction of the legal challenge: rather than Swift protecting her IP from outside exploitation, she is defending a record-breaking album title from a claim that her own creative work infringed someone else’s niche trademark. The August 5 hearing will determine whether the case survives long enough to reach that question on the merits.
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